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Die K Kursk war ein / gebautes, mit Marschflugkörpern bestücktes russisches Atom-U-Boot des Projektes A. Die K Kursk (russisch Курск) war ein / gebautes, mit Marschflugkörpern bestücktes russisches Atom-U-Boot des Projektes A (NATO-Code. Kursk (russisch Курск) ist eine Stadt im europäischen Teil Russlands. Der Asteroid des inneren Hauptgürtels () Kursk ist nach der Stadt benannt. „Kursk“. Als am August das russische U-Boot K Kursk zu einem Manöver der russischen Nordflotte in der Barentssee ausläuft. Als das Atom-U-Boot "Kursk" im August sank, riss es Männer in den Tod. Vor Angehörigen umriss Wladimir Putin als neuer Präsident. Der Untergang der „Kursk“ markiert für manche den Anfang vom Ende der russischen Demokratie. Stefan Scholl. vonStefan Scholl. schließen. Am. Menschen kostete die Kursk-Katastrophe kostete im Jahr das Leben. Sie war ein Drama voller Lügen, Ängste und Hoffnungen, das.
They reported the sounds to Pyotr Velikiy. However, the T made up the bulk of the Soviet armour. Jefferson, N. The 9th Army suffered 23, casualties, while Army Group South suffered 30, casualties. World War II. By 10 Dschungel Camp 2014, the Soviets had completely halted the German advance. Daraufhin wurde sie das Flaggschiff Caché Stream Flottille. Juni den atomgetriebenen Raketen-U-Kreuzern zu. Der Asteroid des inneren Hauptgürtels Schossgebete ist nach der Stadt benannt. Defa Filme Serien Artikel Diskussion. Laut dem offiziellen Kursk wurde vermutlich der Motor eines Übungstorpedos zu früh eingeschaltet. So kollidierte am Familienanzeigen Anzeigenmarkt. Die Stadt war einer der Austragungsorte der Bandy-Weltmeisterschaften Belarus ist aufgewacht. Aber man werde versuchen, herauszukommen. Im Jahr sank das russische U-Boot Kursk. Der dänische Regisseur Thomas Vinterberg macht die Tragödie zum rein westlichen. Die Katastrophe des russischen U-Bootes „Kursk“ erschütterte die Welt: Während eines Manövers der Nordmeerflotte sank es am &. Das Atom-U-Boot „Kursk“ war für die Sowjetunion jahrzehntelang Stolz der Marine. Beim Untergang vor 20 Jahren starben mehr als hundert. Kursk Sinopse e detalhes Video
The Kursk Tragedy - Putin Recounts How He Salvaged the xxl-estate.eu then the Nation Belarus ist aufgewacht. Kursk Mai Diese Möglichkeit des Untergangs der Kursk konnte später ausgeschlossen werden, da bewiesen werden konnte, dass die Stärke der Druckwelle, die bei dem angeblichen Zusammenprall entstanden wäre, keinesfalls mit der tatsächlichen Stärke der Gardy Brombacher übereinstimmen konnte. Nicht nur für die Angehörigen der Seeleute Weissensee Staffel 4 Netflix bange Tage des Wartens. Auf Befehl des Oberkommandos der Pokemon Go Power Up wurde K am 6. International Das Strafverfahren gegen die Marineführung endete jedoch im Juli ergebnislos und wurde eingestellt. Aufgrund Wer Weiss Denn So Was fehlenden Kühlung durch das umgebende Meereswasser überhitzte das Geschoss, wodurch eine Wasserstoffperoxidleitung leckte 85—prozentiges Wasserstoffperoxidsogenanntes HTP oder High Test Peroxidewird für Raketen und Torpedoantriebe verwendet. Mindestens Angebissen Besatzungsmitglieder überlebten zunächst im Inneren des Bootes, konnten sich aber Kursk aus eigener Kraft aus dieser Tiefe befreien. Heute sehen manche in dem Unglück den Kursk vom Ende der russischen Demokratie. Doch auch in beiden Kammern der Legislative, dem Kongress, werden heute die Sitze neu vergeben. Online Kleinanzeigen. The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. The dummy torpedo was ten years old and some of its parts had exceeded their service life. Seconds from Disaster. Archived from the original on 17 Shannara Serie New York: Henry Holt. Kursk Navigation menu Video
The Kursk Tragedy - Putin Recounts How He Salvaged the xxl-estate.eu then the NationSeven days after the sinking, British and Norwegian divers finally opened a hatch to the escape trunk in the boat's flooded ninth compartment but found no survivors.
The Government of Russia and the Russian Navy were intensely criticised over the incident and their responses. Most of the wreck was raised and analyzed.
The official investigation concluded that, as the crew of Kursk was preparing to load a dummy 65—76 "Kit" torpedo , a faulty weld in its casing leaked high-test peroxide HTP , causing the torpedo's kerosene fuel to explode.
The explosion blew off both the inner and outer tube doors, ignited a fire, destroyed the bulkhead between the first and second compartments, damaged the control room in the second compartment, and incapacitated or killed the control room crew.
The torpedo manufacturer challenged this hypothesis, insisting that its design would prevent the kind of event described. Ryazantsev accused the Russian navy of failing to properly train the crew, who did not appear to have properly closed the internal tube hatch cover.
Eventually, the commission concluded that poor oversight, budget cuts, and incomplete maintenance inspections contributed to the explosion.
Two minutes and fifteen seconds after the initial blast, the sub had reached the sea floor when the intense initial fire triggered the detonation of between five and seven torpedo warheads.
The second explosion was equivalent to over two tonnes of TNT. It collapsed the bulkheads between the first three compartments and all the decks, tore a large hole in the hull, destroyed compartment four, and killed everyone still alive forward of the nuclear reactor in the fifth compartment.
The nuclear reactors shut down safely. Following salvage operations, analysts concluded that 23 sailors in the sixth through ninth compartments reached refuge in the small ninth compartment and survived for more than six hours.
As oxygen ran low, crew members attempted to replace a potassium superoxide chemical oxygen cartridge , which accidentally fell into the oily sea water and exploded on contact.
The resulting fire killed several crew members and triggered a flash fire that consumed the remaining oxygen, suffocating the remaining survivors. Lacking information, families of the victims engaged in an angry and volatile meeting with newly elected President Vladimir Putin.
The video coverage of the meeting was sanitised for Russian audiences but leaked to international media. Russian audiences were shocked when they later saw this footage, which showed a distraught wife and mother being forcibly sedated before she was removed from the meeting.
Mammoet was awarded the salvaging contract in May , with the winter weather starting in early October. Within a 3-month period, over 3, tons of custom-made equipment was designed, fabricated, installed and commissioned onto a barge which was mobilized to the Barents Sea in August to raise the hull.
They released only a four-page summary through Rossiyskaya Gazeta , that revealed "stunning breaches of discipline, shoddy, obsolete and poorly maintained equipment", and "negligence, incompetence, and mismanagement".
Moreover, they concluded that the rescue operation was unjustifiably delayed and that the Russian Navy was completely unprepared to respond to the disaster.
On the morning of 12 August , Kursk was in the Barents Sea , participating in the "Summer-X" exercise, the first large-scale naval exercise planned by the Russian Navy in more than a decade, and also its first since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Kursk had recently won a citation for its excellent performance and been recognised as having the best submarine crew in the Northern Fleet.
It was one of the few submarines authorised to carry a combat load at all times. Kursk had a mythical standing.
It was reputedly unsinkable and there were claims it would withstand a direct hit from a torpedo. The inner pressure hull was made of high-quality millimetre 2.
The inner hull was divided into nine water-tight compartments. The boat was as long as two jumbo jets. At local time, Kursk requested permission to conduct a torpedo training launch and received the response " Dobro " "Good".
At local time, [1] the torpedo room crew loaded the first practice Type 65 "Kit" torpedo, Russian: tolstushka , or "fat girl", because of its size , [8] without a warhead, [9] into Kursk ' s number 4 torpedo tube on the starboard side.
It was At , [11] two minutes and 14 seconds after the first, a second event, measuring 4. The seismic data showed that the explosion occurred at the same depth as the sea bed.
The crew of the submarine Karelia detected the explosion but the captain assumed that it was part of the exercise. The scheduled time period for Kursk to complete the practice torpedo firing expired at without any contact from the sub.
Accustomed to the frequent failure of communications equipment, Fleet Commander Admiral Vyacheslav Alekseyevich Popov aboard Pyotr Velikiy was not initially alarmed.
The Northern Fleet duty officer notified the head of the fleet's search and rescue forces, Captain Alexander Teslenko, to stand by for orders.
Teslenko's primary rescue ship was a year-old former lumber carrier, Mikhail Rudnitsky , which had been converted to support submersible rescue operations.
Petersburg yard for pending repairs. At , an Ilyushin 38 aircraft was dispatched. The crew spent three hours unsuccessfully searching for Kursk.
After repeated failures, at they began a search and rescue operation, dispatching additional aircraft to locate the submarine, which again failed to locate the boat on the surface.
The Mikhail Rudnitsky left port at The Russian Navy initially downplayed the incident. Late on Saturday night, nine hours after the boat sank, Northern Fleet commander Admiral Popov ordered the first search for the submarine.
Sergeyev "did not recommend" that Putin visit the disaster site. On Sunday, after Popov already knew that Kursk was missing and presumed sunk, he briefed reporters on the progress of the naval exercise.
He said the exercise had been a resounding success and spoke highly of the entire operation. Early on Sunday morning, 13 August, at the Vidyaevo Naval Base, rumours began to circulate among family members of Kursk ' s crew that something was wrong.
A telephone operator handled an unusual volume of calls and overheard that a submarine was in trouble and the boat's name. As the base was very small, news spread quickly.
Wives and family members exchanged news, but information was scarce. Because Kursk was regarded as unsinkable, family members wished to discount the worst of the rumours.
They hoped that Kursk was merely experiencing a temporary communication problem. The deputy base commander assured the women that the headquarters office was half empty and that the officers present were just "passing the time.
On the afternoon of the explosion, before the Kremlin had been informed of the submarine's sinking, U. At on Sunday, 13 August, personnel aboard Pyotr Velikiy detected two anomalies on the seabed that might be the boat.
While setting anchor, its crew interpreted an acoustic sound as an SOS from the submarine, but soon concluded the noise had been produced by the anchor chain striking the anchor hole.
As the AS was damaged by the collision and had to surface, the crew of Mikhail Rudnitsky began preparing the AS for operation.
At , the AS entered the water and began searching for Kursk. It was unable to locate the submarine, because it had been given an incorrect heading by personnel aboard Pyotr Velikiy.
Crew aboard Mikhail Rudnitsky tried to contact Kursk and briefly thought they heard an acoustic SOS signal, but this was determined to be of biological origin.
They reported the sounds to Pyotr Velikiy. The AS returned to the surface at on Monday morning, 14 August. The salvage tug Nikolay Chiker SB arrived early in the rescue operation.
Using deep water camera equipment it obtained the first images of the wrecked submarine, which showed severe damage from the sub's bow [12] to its sail.
The AS was repaired and was launched at on Monday. At , the AS located Kursk and unsuccessfully tried to attach to the aft escape trunk over Kursk ' s ninth compartment.
Unable to create the vacuum seal necessary to attach to the escape trunk, its batteries were quickly depleted and the crew was forced to surface.
No spare batteries were available, so the crew was forced to wait while the batteries were recharged. Meanwhile, winds increased, blowing 10—12 metres per second 19—23 knots to 15—27 metres per second 29—52 knots , and the waves rose to 3—4 points 4—8 feet, 1.
The first official announcement of the accident was made by the Russians on Monday, 14 August. They told the media that Kursk had had "minor technical difficulties" on Sunday.
They stated that the submarine had "descended to the ocean floor", that they had established contact with the crew and were pumping air and power to the boat, and that "everyone on board is alive.
Senior officers in the Russian Navy offered a variety of explanations for the accident. The Russian government convened a commission, chaired by vice-premier Ilya Klebanov , on 14 August, two days after Kursk sank.
Independent investigators were not invited to take part, giving the appearance that the commission's findings might not be impartial.
Bad weather, 3. They also tried and failed to manoeuvre a remotely operated vehicle ROV onto the rescue hatch. At Tuesday, AS was launched again but was damaged when it struck a boom as it was being lowered into the sea.
It was brought back aboard, repaired, and relaunched at The rescue team decided to launch the submersible near the coast and tow it to the rescue site with a salvage tug.
On Wednesday, 16 August, at , AS twice attempted to attach to the ninth compartment escape hatch but was unsuccessful.
It surfaced and, as it was being lifted onto the deck of the mother ship, its propulsion system was seriously damaged.
Rescue operations were suspended while the repairs were made. One of the rescue capsules was damaged by the storm.
On Thursday at , Popov reported to the General Staff of the Navy that no explosion had occurred on the Kursk , that the sub was intact on the seafloor, and that an "external influence" might have caused a leak between the first and second compartments.
The rescue ship Altay attempted to attach a Kolokol diving bell [31] to the sub but was unsuccessful.
Other reports said the sounds had been misinterpreted or were made up. Rescue divers did not attempt to tap on the hull to signal potential survivors acoustically.
Fragments of both the outer and inner hulls were found nearby, including a piece of Kursk ' s nose weighing 5 tonnes 4.
Private media and state-owned Russian newspapers criticised the navy's refusal to accept international assistance.
Six teams of British and Norwegian divers arrived on Friday, 18 August. Russian Navy officials imposed specific constraints that restricted the Norwegian divers to work on the stern of the boat, specifically the escape hatch over compartment nine and an air control valve connected to the rescue trunk.
When the divers attempted to open the air control valve, it would not move. Russian experts on one of the most technologically advanced submarines in the Russian fleet told the divers that they must open the valve counter-clockwise or they would break it.
The divers finally went against the experts' advice and tried turning it clockwise, which worked. The divers tried to use the arms of the ROV to open the hatch but were unsuccessful until the morning of Monday, 21 August; they found the rescue trunk full of water.
Divers lowered a video camera on a rod into the compartment and could see several bodies. The salvage companies agreed that the Norwegian divers would cut the holes in the hull but only Russian divers would enter the submarine.
They found that dust and ashes inside compartment nine severely restricted visibility. As they gradually worked their way inside the compartment and down two levels, Warrant Officer Sergei Shmygin found the remains of Captain-lieutenant Dmitry Kolesnikov.
This contradicted earlier statements made by senior Russian officials that all of the submariners had died before the submarine hit the bottom.
On 21 August, after the Norwegian divers confirmed that no one was alive in the ninth compartment, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Northern Fleet, Mikhail Motsak , announced to the public that the Kursk was flooded and all of its crewmembers had died.
Additional plans were made to continue to remove the bodies, but the Russian Navy could not agree on a contract with a foreign company.
The families of those who died on the submarine protested that they did not want additional lives put at risk to bring up the dead. On Monday 14 August, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov stated the accident had been caused by a serious collision with a NATO submarine, [26] although he gave no evidence to support his statement.
Many who desired a continuance of negative relations between Russia and the West supported this scenario.
During the original exercise, the Russians required each of their submarines to stay within a specified area.
This protocol was intended to eliminate the possibility of a collision and to allow surface ships to detect the presence of a Western spy sub. On 29 or 30 August , an official government commission tasked with investigating the disaster announced that the likely cause of the sinking was a "strong 'dynamic external impact' corresponding with the 'first event'", probably a collision with a foreign submarine or a large surface ship, or striking a World War II mine.
When the exercise was cancelled due to the accident, these vessels put in at European ports. Cohen responded to Russian accusations of a collision with a submarine at a press conference in Tokyo on 22 September Q: Russians are suggesting that one of the possible reasons is a collision with a NATO or American submarine, they are asking to let them, well, have a look at a couple of United States submarines and the answer from the American side is no; so I ask, why not?
And what is your own explanation of that particular accident. Thank you. A: I know that all our ships are operational and could not possibly have been involved in any kind of contact with the Russian submarine.
So frankly, there is no need for inspections, since ours are completely operational, there was no contact whatsoever with the Kursk.
The Russian navy produced video footage of the wreck that they claimed showed evidence that this, too, resulted from a collision.
Admiral Mikhail Motsak repeated this assertion on 17 November in an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia.
The Russian Navy produced satellite imagery of the U. But geophysicists who analysed the seismic signals concluded and reported in February that the initial sound recorded was triggered by an explosion and not a collision with another vessel.
When analysts compared the second event with the first, they concluded that the first event was also the explosion of a torpedo.
Britain's Blacknest seismic monitoring station, which studies seismic signals generated by underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes, [50] identified two distinct explosions.
They determined that the two shockwaves were a perfect match and consistent with a torpedo explosion. While the rescue crews repeatedly failed to attach to the rescue trunk and to contact potential survivors aboard the submarine, President Putin was shown on TV enjoying himself on a summer holiday at a villa on the Black Sea.
His seeming indifference outraged the families of the Kursk sailors and many other Russians. Twenty-four hours after the submarine's disappearance, as Russian naval officials made bleak calculations about the chances of the men on board, Putin was filmed enjoying himself, shirtsleeves rolled up, hosting a barbecue at his holiday villa on the Black Sea.
The Russian media strongly criticised the government's response to and handling of the sinking. Some were unable to confirm whether their family members were among the crew on board the boat.
Even then, the government tried to prohibit reporters from contacting family members. The continued problems that the rescuers had in reaching potential survivors and ongoing conflicting information about the cause of the accident inflamed Russian public opinion.
President Putin had been advised by the military from the start of the disaster that they had the situation under control and that he did not need to intervene.
The hostile, contentious meeting lasted for three [53] to six hours. German television channel RTL provided the Russian national daily newspaper Kommersant with an unedited transcript.
The family members knew from media reports that foreign assistance had been offered on Monday. The Russian state channel RTR was the only media granted access.
Their severely edited broadcast of the meeting showed only the president speaking, eliminating the many emotional and contentious encounters between the President and family members.
During the meeting, Nadezhda Tylik, the mother of Kursk submariner Lt. Sergei Tylik, was extremely emotional and interrupted the meeting. She harangued Putin and Deputy Prime Minister Klebanov, accusing them of lying to the family members.
She told them, "You better shoot yourselves now! We won't let you live, bastards! She quickly lost the ability to speak and was carried out.
Tylik later said, "The injection was done to shut my mouth. Immediately after it, I just lost the ability to speak and was carried out.
The whole scene was captured by the TV crew, but it was not televised within Russia. Foreign media showed Tylik being removed by officials from the meeting.
But we did not receive concrete answers to concrete questions," she said. Petersburg Times that she would go to any lengths to learn the truth about the submarine disaster "They told us lies the whole time, and even now we are unable to get any information," she said.
Russians and observers in the West were shocked by the incident and feared that the public sedation of a crew member's mother meant that the former Soviet Union was returning to Cold War -era methods of silencing dissent.
Those who are guilty must be punished. Petersburg Times that Tylik was given a sedative. Journalist Andrey Kolesnikov, who had been present at Putin's meeting with the families, described his experience in a documentary titled President.
He said when he watched Putin talk to the families, he had never felt such an intense atmosphere of pain and anger in his entire life.
I honestly thought they would tear him apart There was such a heavy atmosphere there, such a clot of hatred, and despair, and pain I never felt anything like it anywhere in my entire life All the questions were aimed at this single man In response to the avalanche of criticism, Minister of Defence Sergeyev and senior commanders of the Navy and the Northern Fleet offered Putin their resignations, but he refused to accept them.
Putin lashed back at the press, who had been severely critical of his personal response and the entire government's handling of a national tragedy.
Putin told the family members, "There are people in television today who They stole money, they bought the media, and they're manipulating public opinion.
He shouted to the assembled families, "They're lying. They're lying. Then they might have to explain why all this property is registered in false names under front law-firms.
Perhaps we would ask them where they got the money. In a speech to the Russian people the day after his meeting with the families, Putin continued his furious attack on the Russian media, accusing them of lying and discrediting the country.
He said they were trying to "exploit this misfortune On the same day as Putin's broadcast, Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko , head of a special commission, announced that the families of the Kursk sailors would receive not only 10 years' salary, but free housing in the Russian city of their choice, free college education for their children, and free counselling.
On 26 July , almost two years later, the government commission and Russia's Prosecutor General, Vladimir Ustinov , announced that the hydrogen peroxide fuel in the dummy torpedo inside the fourth torpedo launcher set off the initial explosion that sank Kursk.
Ustinov released a volume top-secret report in August , two years after the disaster. The government published a four-page summary in Rossiyskaya Gazeta that revealed "stunning breaches of discipline, shoddy, obsolete and poorly maintained equipment", [16] [66] and "negligence, incompetence, and mismanagement".
The bulkhead should have arrested the blast wave, [67] but in keeping with common Russian submarine practice, the pressurised valve in the ventilation system that traversed the bulkhead was left open to minimise the change in pressure during a weapon's launch.
The open valve in the ventilation system allowed the huge blast wave and possibly the fire and toxic smoke to enter the second and perhaps the third and fourth compartments as well.
Although the sub was at periscope depth with her radio antennas extended, no one in the command post was able to send a distress signal or press a single button that would initiate an emergency ballast tank blow and bring the submarine to the surface.
Two minutes and 14 seconds after the first explosion in the torpedo compartment, [11] the fire set off a second explosion of 5—7 combat-ready torpedo warheads.
Acoustic data from Pyotr Velikiy was later analysed and found to indicate an explosion of about 7 torpedo warheads in rapid succession.
While the sub was submerged, 78 crew were normally assigned to the first four compartments and 49 to the rear five compartments. In addition to the crew in those compartments, there were five officers from 7th SSGN Division Headquarters and two design engineers on board to observe the performance of a new battery in the USET torpedo, set to be launched second.
Anyone who remained alive in those compartments was killed by the second explosion. The government report confirmed that Kursk had been sunk by a torpedo explosion caused when high-test peroxide HTP , a form of highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide, leaked from cracks in the torpedo's casing.
HTP is normally stable until it comes in contact with a catalyst. It then expands 5, times in volume extremely rapidly, acting as an oxidiser , generating large volumes of steam and oxygen.
Its position, distance, and direction relative to the rest of the submarine indicated that it was deposited there as a result of the first explosion in that tube.
The fuel in the torpedoes carried by Kursk was inexpensive and very powerful. According to an article that briefly appeared on Thursday 17 August on the website of the official newspaper of the Russian Defence Ministry, Krasnaya Zvezda , Kursk had been refitted in —four years after it was commissioned—to carry torpedoes fuelled using the cheap HTP.
The article reported that some specialists in the Russian Navy opposed use of the HTP-fuelled torpedoes because they were volatile and dangerous.
The story did not appear in the print edition on Friday 18 August. Instead, the article was replaced with another that speculated the submarine had collided with an "unidentified object".
The change was likely due to political pressure. As head of the defence industries, over the objections of some officers, he had promoted use of the liquid-fuelled torpedoes over safer, more-expensive silver-zinc battery-powered torpedoes.
The government's final report found that the officers who had issued the order approving use of the HTP torpedoes did not have the authority to issue that order.
The dummy torpedo was ten years old and some of its parts had exceeded their service life. Several sources said that one of the practice torpedoes had been dropped during transport, possibly leading to a crack in the casing, but that the weapon was put aboard the submarine anyway.
Personnel who had loaded the practice torpedoes the day before the exercise noticed that the rubber seals were leaking fuel and notified junior officers of the issue, but they took no action because the exercise was so important to the Russian Navy.
Maintenance records revealed that the 65—76 "Kit" practice torpedo carried by Kursk came from a batch of ten manufactured in , six of which were rejected due to faulty welding.
An investigation revealed that because the torpedoes were not intended to carry warheads, the welds had not been inspected as carefully as welds on torpedoes carrying warheads.
When salvage crews finally recovered the remains of the torpedo and the launch tube, analysis determined that both bore signs of distortion and heat damage that were consistent with an explosion near the middle of the torpedo, very close to an essential welded joint.
The official conclusion of the commission was that a faulty weld had led to the explosion. In an emergency, personnel in the rear compartments were to move forward to the third compartment along with those in the forward compartments and enter a detachable rescue capsule in the sail or conning tower , which was capable of evacuating the entire crew.
The fifth compartment that contained the boat's two nuclear reactors was built to withstand larger forces than other interior bulkheads.
The reactors were additionally encased in 13 centimetres 5. The bulkheads of the fifth compartment withstood both explosions, allowing the two reactors to shut down automatically and prevent a nuclear meltdown and widespread contamination of the sea.
The fifth compartment contained the nuclear reactors and equipment that automatically recorded the operating activity of the boat. Twenty-two recordings were analysed by specialists from the St.
Petersburg Center of Speech Technologies. They discovered that the system had been turned off the day of the accident in violation of procedure.
Kursk was equipped with an emergency rescue buoy on top of compartment seven that was designed to automatically deploy when it detected any of a variety of emergency conditions like a fire or a rapid pressure change.
Russian navy officers feared that the buoy might accidentally deploy, revealing the submarine's position to the U. They ordered the buoy to be disabled and it was still inoperative when the sub sank.
Despite the many lapses in procedures and equipment, Ustinov said no charges would be filed because the disaster was caused by a technical malfunction and blame could not be placed on specific individuals.
He said that all of the sailors had died within eight hours and none of them could have been rescued in the time available. At a news conference announcing the end of the official inquiry, he absolved the torpedo's manufacturer of any fault.
When Ustinov closed the criminal case without filing charges, [43] family members were angry. He said, "To me, this is a clear case of negligence.
While the official government commission blamed the explosion on a faulty weld in the practice torpedo, Vice-Admiral Valery Ryazantsev cited inadequate training, poor maintenance, and incomplete inspections that caused the crew to mishandle the weapon.
This led investigators to conclude that it was likely that the internal door was not fully closed when the explosion occurred.
It was known that the electrical connectors between the torpedoes and the internal tube door were unreliable and often required the torpedo crews to open and re-close the door to clean the connection before an electrical contact could be established.
Kursk ' s crew had not fired a torpedo for three years, and that torpedo was a much simpler battery-powered type. This included cleaning the torpedo tube of lubricants, metal shavings, and dust that accumulate during long periods of inactivity.
After the accident, investigators recovered a partially burned copy of the safety instructions for loading HTP torpedoes, but the instructions were for a significantly different type of torpedo and failed to include essential steps for testing an air valve.
Ryazantsev believed that due to their inexperience and lack of training, compounded by incomplete inspections and oversight, and because Kursk ' s crew followed faulty instructions when loading the practice torpedo, they set off a chain of events that led to the explosion.
The Komsomolskaya Pravda tabloid published a report in June that senior officers in the Russian Navy had engaged in an elaborate deception to cover the actual cause of the disaster.
This referred to statements that the boat's captain, Gennady Lyachin , had sent a message to headquarters immediately prior to the explosion, "We have a malfunctioning torpedo.
Request permission to fire it," [5] though it is unlikely that, as captain of the vessel, he would have needed to request permission under such circumstances.
The Russian Navy was later criticised as misrepresenting facts and misleading the public. The hopelessly flawed rescue attempt, hampered by badly designed and decrepit equipment, illustrated the fatal decline of Russia's military power.
The navy's callous approach to the families of the missing men was reminiscent of an earlier Soviet insensitivity to individual misery.
The lies and incompetent cover-up attempts launched by both the navy and the government were resurrected from a pre- Glasnost era.
The wildly contradictory conspiracy theories about what caused the catastrophe said more about a naval high command in turmoil, fumbling for a scapegoat , than about the accident itself.
While most experts agreed that a torpedo had exploded, they differed on what caused the explosion.
Many Russians did not believe that Kursk could be so easily sunk. The tragedy spawned a number of wild conspiracy theories to explain the disaster.
He said the weapon could have exploded only after an external event like a fire. The sub was equipped with a special drain system that could rapidly drain hydrogen peroxide fuel from a torpedo into the sea.
If a temperature rise was detected in the torpedo tube, the torpedo would have automatically been ejected into the sea.
In addition, any fire in the torpedo compartment would have triggered a powerful fire-extinguishing system that would have dumped "tons of water" on the fire.
It became the largest salvage operation of its type ever accomplished. Only seven of the submarine's 24 torpedoes were accounted for.
Salvage divers from Halliburton [85] first detached the bow from the rest of the vessel because it might have contained unexploded torpedo warheads and because it could break off and destabilise the lifting.
It took ten days to detach the bow. After the bow was cut free, the salvage crews raised several smaller pieces of wreckage.
This included a piece of a torpedo tube weighing about a ton which was analysed to try to learn if the explosion occurred inside or outside the tube.
They salvaged a high-pressure compressed air cylinder weighing about half a ton, [88] to learn more about the nature of the explosion.
They also raised a part of the cylindrical section of the hard frame and part of the left forward spherical partition, to determine the intensity and temperature of the fire in the forward compartment.
Finally, they brought up a fragment of the sonar system dome. The ship was designed to carry huge loads on its deck, but Kursk would ride beneath the ship.
Giant 4 had to be completely modified to retrieve and carry the sub underneath. To raise the remainder of the boat, the salvage team planned an extremely complex operation that required them to design and build custom lifting equipment and employ new technologies.
They wrote custom software that would automatically compensate for the effects of wave motion due to the rough Barents Sea , which could sever the cables suspending the sub beneath the barge.
Divers cut a large hole in the barge's hull to allow room for the submarine's sail. Workers fitted the hull of Giant 4 with large saddles shaped to fit Kursk ' s outer hull.
They cut holes through the barge to allow 26 hoisting cables to pass through. The giant cable reels fed 26 huge hydraulic strand jacks , each mounted on a computer-controlled, pressurised pneumatic heave compensator powered by nitrogen gas that automatically adjusted for sea waves.
Mayo , a diving platform, was equipped with dive chambers to accommodate the dive teams. They worked in six-hour shifts, and when they were not in the water, the divers remained in the saturation chambers for the entire 28 days the operation took.
The salvage divers mounted custom guidance rings around the holes in the sub and lowered guide cables to each through the holes in Giant 4.
The team then used the four guide cables to lower a custom-made giant gripper, similar to a toggle bolt , which were custom designed to fit each hole, and the divers manoeuvred them through the guidance ring.
Delaying the progress of Kempf allowed Red Army forces time to prepare their second belt of defence to meet the German attack on 6 July.
By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves, except for three rifle divisions under the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively contain the 4th Panzer Army.
By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds, settling in a solid layer on roadside bushes, grain fields, tanks and trucks. The dark red disc of the sun was hardly visible.
Tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery tractors, armoured personnel carriers and trucks were advancing in an unending flow.
The faces of the soldiers were dark with dust and exhaust fumes. It was intolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirst and their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to their bodies.
Although intended to be concerted, the counterattack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks due to poor coordination.
The 2nd Tank Corps joined in the afternoon and was also repelled. But it was detected by German air reconnaissance just before the attack had materialized, and was subsequently decimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed with MK anti-tank cannons and at least 50 tanks were destroyed.
On 10 July the full effort of the corps was shifted back to its own forward progress. The direction of their advance now shifted from Oboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka.
Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since early May, and it was a part of the 4th Panzer Army's plan since the outset of the offensive.
Though the German advance in the south was slower than planned, it was faster than the Soviets expected. The next day, the first German infantry crossed the river.
Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses remained lower than the Soviets'. On 11 July, Army Detachment Kempf finally achieved a breakthrough.
In a surprise night attack, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge across the Donets. Once there, they were to strike southeast to attack the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka from the flanks and rear.
The 1st and 2nd SS Panzer divisions were to wait until 3rd SS Panzer Division attack had destabilised the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka; and once underway, the 1st SS Panzer Division was to attack the main Soviet defences dug in on the slopes southwest of Prokhorovka.
To the division's right, the 2nd SS Panzer Division was to advance eastward, then turn southward away from Prokhorovka to roll up the Soviet lines opposing the III Panzer Corps' advance and force a gap.
At around , a Soviet artillery barrage began. At , Rotmistrov radioed his tankers: "Steel, Steel, Steel!
Tasked with flanking the Soviet defences around Prokhorovka, the unit first had to beat off a number of attacks before they could go over onto the offensive.
Most of the division's tank losses occurred late in the afternoon as they advanced through mine fields against well-hidden Soviet anti-tank guns.
Although the 3rd SS succeeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road, their hold was tenuous and it cost the division half of its armour.
The majority of German tank losses suffered at Prokhorovka occurred here. Although the Soviet counterattack failed with heavy losses, throwing them back onto the defensive, they did enough to stop a German breakthrough.
The threat of further Allied landings in Italy or along southern France made Hitler believe it was essential to stop the offensive and move forces from Kursk to Italy.
Kluge welcomed the news, as he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive counter-offensive against his sector but Manstein was less welcoming.
Manstein's forces had just spent a week fighting through a maze of defensive works and he believed they were on the verge of breaking through to more open terrain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle.
Manstein stated, "On no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he [has] committed [are] completely beaten".
The offensive continued in the southern part with the launch of Operation Roland on 14 July. One division was transferred to Italy and the other two were sent south to meet new Soviet offensives.
These reserves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards Tank Army, which launched Operation Rumyantsev a couple of weeks later.
During Operation Citadel, the Luftwaffe flew 27, sorties in support with combat losses a 0. Soviet units from 5 to 8 July conducted 11, sorties with combat losses of aircraft 4.
Despite German unit performance, the Wehrmacht was now lacking strategic reserves. During the defensive preparations in the months leading up to Citadel, the Soviets also planned and prepared counteroffensive operations that would be launched after the German offensive had halted.
Soviet offensive operations for the summer of were planned to begin after the strength of the German forces had been dissipated by their Kursk offensive.
The Bryansk Front , under the command of Markian Popov , attacked the eastern face of the Orel salient while the Western Front , commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky , attacked from the north.
The Soviet spearheads sustained heavy casualties, but pushed through and in some areas achieved significant penetrations.
These thrusts endangered German supply routes and threatened the 9th Army with encirclement. The thinly stretched 2nd Panzer Army stood in the way of this Soviet force.
The German commanders had been wary of such an attack and forces were quickly withdrawn from the Kursk offensive to meet the Soviet offensive.
Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel salient and inflicted substantial losses on the German military, paving the way for the liberation of Smolensk.
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the main Soviet offensive for Diversionary attacks , launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and Mius Rivers into the Donbass, drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces that would face the main blow.
They drove through the German positions, making broad and deep penetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated Belgorod.
By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been reached. In the ensuing tank battles, the Soviet armies suffered heavy losses in armour. After heavy fighting the city was liberated on 23 August.
This battle is referred to by the Germans as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets refer to it as the Belgorod—Kharkov offensive operation.
The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough; [] the maximum depth of the German advance was 8—12 kilometres 5.
This result changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with the Soviet Union gaining the operational initiative.
The Soviet victory was costly, with the Red Army losing considerably more men and materiel than the German Army.
However, the Soviet Union's larger industrial potential and pool of manpower allowed them to absorb and replenish these losses.
With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come.
It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front Needless to say the [Soviets] exploited their victory to the full.
There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.
With victory, the initiative firmly passed to the Red Army. For the remainder of the war the Germans were limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never able to regain the initiative or launch a major offensive on the Eastern Front.
Though the location, plan of attack, and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the liberty to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military matters progressively increased while his attention to the political aspects of the war decreased.
Stalin stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resulting in the Red Army gaining more freedom of action during the course of the war.
The casualties suffered by the two combatants are difficult to determine, due to several factors. In regard to the Germans, equipment losses were complicated by the fact that they made determined efforts to recover and repair tanks.
For example, tanks disabled one day often appeared a day or two later repaired. Many were transferred to the United States national archives and were not made available until , while others were taken by the Soviet Union, which declined to confirm their existence.
Russian military historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev , who based his figures on the Soviet archives, is considered by historian David Glantz as the most reliable source for Soviet casualty figures.
The Voronezh Front suffered 27, irrecoverable casualties and 46, medical casualties, for a total of 73, The Steppe Front suffered 27, irrecoverable casualties and 42, medical casualties, for a total of 70, During the two Soviet offensives, total casualties amounted to , men.
During Operation Kutuzov, Soviet losses amounted to , irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties, for a total loss of , men. The Bryansk Front suffered 39, irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties.
The Central Front lost 47, irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48, irrecoverable casualties and , medical casualties, for a total of , The Steppe Front lost 23, irrecoverable casualties and 75, medical casualties, for a total of 98, The Soviet losses were roughly three times larger than the German losses.
The loss ratio suffered by the Soviets was roughly in favour of the German military. Soviet tank strength went back up to 2, tanks by 3 August due to the repair of damaged vehicles.
According to historian Christer Bergström, Soviet Air Forces losses during the German offensive amounted to aircraft on the northern flank and on the southern flank.
Total casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates total Soviet air losses between 12 July and 18 August, during the German offensive and the Operation Kutuzov counteroffensive, were 1, Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive record, calculated that during Operation Citadel 54, casualties were suffered.
Of these, 9, were killed, 1, were reported missing and 43, were wounded. The 9th Army suffered 23, casualties, while Army Group South suffered 30, casualties.
In facing Operation Kutuzov, 14, men were killed, 11, were reported missing presumed killed or captured and 60, were wounded.
Total casualties for the three battles were about 50, killed or missing and , wounded per German military medical data. During Operation Citadel, to tanks and assault guns were destroyed.
By 5 July, when the Battle of Kursk started, there were only operational Panthers. Within two days, this had dropped to Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days.
By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the frontline. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front.
About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair service On the evening of 11 July, 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total writeoffs and were in need of repair.
A slow increase in the combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits 81 Panthers up to 10 July attests to the heavy fighting.
Thus, a report on 11 August showed that the numbers of total writeoffs in Panthers swelled to , with only 9 operational.
The German Army was forced into a fighting retreat and increasingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles.
Most of these occurred during their offensive at Kursk. The total number of German tanks and assault guns destroyed during July and August along the entire Eastern Front amount to 1, Of these, Frieser estimates that were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk.
Frieser reports Luftwaffe losses at planes, with lost during the German offensive, destroyed during Operation Kutuzov, and a further lost during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Operation Citadel: , men [1] 2, tanks [1] 9, guns and mortars [2]. Operation Citadel: 1,, men [5] 5, tanks [5] 25, guns and mortars [2].
Operation Citadel: [d] [8] 54, men [9] [e] [10] — tanks and assault guns destroyed, [11] [12] 1, tanks and assault guns damaged [13] [14] aircraft [15] [16] c.
Eastern Front. Battle of Kursk. See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle. Main article: Battle of Prokhorovka. Main article: Operation Kutuzov.
Main article: Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation. Bergström , p. Orel-counter ; 2, Belgorod-counter ; 1, Citino used the term to comment on the failure of the operation: "The operation misfired from the start.
There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks". Citino In The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, , Citino did not use the term "blitzkrieg", instead describing Citadel as an attempted operation in the classical tradition of Bewegungskrieg , literally: "war of movement", or maneuver warfare , culminating in a Kesselschlacht literally: "cauldron battle", or battle of encirclement Citino In "Achtung Panzer!
He listed three elements: surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. Of these, surprise was by far the most important.
Guderian , p. The great commitment certainly would not bring us equivalent gains. The figure for German manpower refers to ration strength which includes non-combatants and wounded soldiers still in medical installations.
The figures for guns and mortars are estimates based on the strength and number of units slated for the operation; the figure for tanks and assault guns include those in workshops.
Some comrades became frightened, leaped out of the trenches, and began to run away. The commander saw who was running and quickly forced them back into the trenches, making it sternly clear that they had to stay put.
The tanks reached the trench line and, with a terrible roar, clattered overhead In addition to the units listed below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd Armies.
Clark , p. Perhaps the order of battle below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel. The German Freya radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel.
Bergström , pp. Weapons and military equipment. Production and loss. Ivanov, A. Georgievsky and O. Dial Pixpex News. Archived from the original on 4 July Retrieved 6 August Retrieved 17 June Retrieved 20 October The 2nd Army was tasked with pushing the western face of the salient once the encirclement was completed, but never got do so since the northern and southern pincers failed to meet at Kursk..
Dunn Jr. Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, Stackpole Books. Retrieved 5 May Military Publishing House Moscow. Retrieved 4 July Atkinson, Rick The Liberation Trilogy.
New York: Henry Holt. Beevor, Antony The Second World War. New York: Back Bay Books. Bellamy, Christopher October RUSI Journal.
Bergström, Christer Barbier, Mary Kathryn Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, Zenith Imprint. Brand, Dieter Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift in German.
Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport 6. Archived from the original on 1 November Bauman, Walter Archived from the original PDF on 20 June Citino, Robert M.
Archived from the original on 7 October Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict — New York: Morrow. Clark, Lloyd London: Headline Publishing Group.
Copeland, B. Retrieved 14 June Corum, James January The Journal of Military History. Dunn, Walter Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
Empric, Bruce E. Seattle: Teufelsberg Press. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Gerwehr, Scott; Glenn, Russell W.
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London: Osprey. Stroud: History Press. Jacobsen, Hans Adolf; Rohwer, Jürgen New York, NY: Putnam. Jentz, Tom; Doyle, Hillary Tiger 1 Heavy Tank — Osprey Publishing.
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Litvin, Nikolai; Britton, Stuart Modern War Studies. Willmott, Hedley Paul New York: Free Press. Moorhouse, Roger Berlin at war: Life and Death in Hitler's capital, — London: Vintage.
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